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In one of the most pivotal cases of the Fall 2006 Term, the United 
States Supreme Court upheld the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 
20031 by a vote of 5-4.2 Stating that the Act was not “void for 
vagueness” and that it did not impose “an undue burden on a 
woman’s right to abortion based on its overbreadth or lack of a health 
exception,”3 the Court found the Act to be facially valid, despite the 
absence of an exception for cases in which an abortion is necessary to 
preserve the health of the mother.4 The case signaled a departure 
from the Court’s long-standing abortion jurisprudence, and provided 
an enormous amount of insight into the “Roberts Court.” The 
decision was the first major indication of how the Court will deal with 
abortion, how the Court feels about precedent, and how much 
deference the Court will give congressional findings of fact. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
In 1992, the Supreme Court revisited its monumental decision in 
Roe v. Wade5 and upheld the “central holding” of the case—“the 
woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy before viability.”6 However, 
the Court discarded the rigid trimester framework employed by Roe,7 
and held that an “undue burden standard” should be used to 
determine whether a regulation restricting abortion before the fetus is 
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 1. 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006). 
 2. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007). 
 3. Id. at 1627. 
 4. Id. at 1639. 
 5. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 6. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871 (1992). 
 7. Id. at 873. 
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viable is constitutional.8 Later, in 2000, the Supreme Court had the 
opportunity to apply these principles to a Nebraska statute banning 
“partial-birth abortion.”9 
To fully understand the application of the Nebraska statute 
reviewed by the Court in Stenberg v. Carhart and the similar federal 
statute involved in Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. v. 
Gonzales one must have a basic understanding of at least two types of 
post-first trimester abortion methods—non-intact dilation and 
evacuation (“D&E”) and intact dilation and evacuation (“intact 
D&E,” also known as “partial-birth abortion”). Each type of D&E is 
a surgical procedure consisting of two steps: “dilation of the cervix 
and surgical removal (evacuation) of the fetus.”10 
The first step, cervical dilation, which is “necessary so that the 
doctor may insert an instrument . . . through the cervix and into the 
uterus in order to remove the fetus,” is the same for both forms of 
D&E.11 The second step, on the contrary, differs for each form of 
D&E. 
During non-intact D&E, “the doctor, under ultrasound guidance, 
grasps a fetal extremity and attempts to bring the fetus through the 
cervix.” The traction from the cervix is then used to “disarticulate, or 
break apart,” the fetus. Next, the doctor makes additional passes into 
the uterus “to remove the remaining parts of the fetus, causing further 
disarticulation,” and finally, the doctor removes “any remaining 
material using a suction tube . . . and a spoon-like instrument . . . .”12 
In performing an intact D&E, “the doctor, rather than using 
multiple passes of the forceps to disarticulate and remove the fetus, 
removes the fetus in one pass, without any disarticulation occurring.” 
In the case of a vertex presentation, the doctor first collapses the 
head, and then “uses forceps to grasp the fetus and extracts it through 
the cervix.” In the case of a breech presentation, “the doctor begins by 
grasping a lower extremity and pulling it through the cervix, at which 
point the head typically becomes lodged in the cervix.” Then, “the 
 
 8. Id. at 877. 
 9. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
 10. Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 
2006). 
 11. Id. at 1167. 
 12. Id. 
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doctor can either collapse the head and then remove the fetus or 
continue pulling to disarticulate at the neck.”13 
In a 5-4 decision in Stenberg v. Carhart, the Supreme Court held 
that Nebraska’s statute banning “partial-birth abortion” violated the 
Federal Constitution “for at least two independent reasons.”14 First, 
the Court found the statute unconstitutional because it lacked an 
exception for the preservation of the health of the mother.15 In 
addition, the Court found that the plain language of the statute 
covered both non-intact and intact D&Es,16 and thus “result[ed] in an 
undue burden upon a woman’s right to make an abortion decision.”17 
In response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Stenberg v. 
Carhart, Congress passed the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 
2003.18 While the federal statute closely resembles the statute the 
Court struck down in Stenberg v. Carhart, the language of the statute 
is slightly different. In drafting the federal statute, Congress included 
the requirement of delivery beyond certain anatomical landmarks and 
the performance of an “overt-act, other than completion of delivery, 
that kills the partially delivered living fetus” before liability is 
triggered for the doctor performing the abortion.19 
However, as with the Nebraska statute, no exception for the 
health of the mother was included in the federal statute. Instead of 
including a health exception, “Congress made several findings of fact 
in support of its determination that the Act’s prohibition did not 
require a health exception.”20 These included findings that “the facts 
indicate that a partial-birth abortion is never necessary to preserve 
the health of a woman, poses serious risks to a woman’s health, and 
lies outside the standard of medical care,”21 and that “[a] moral, 
medical, and ethical consensus exists that the practice of performing a 
 
 13. Id. 
 14. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 930. 
 15. Id. at 937–38. 
 16. Id. at 939–40. 
 17. Id. at 946. 
 18. 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006). 
 19. 18 U.S.C. § 1531(b)(1) (2006). 
 20. Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163, 1169 (9th Cir. 
2006). 
 21. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 § 2(13), 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2003). 
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partial-birth abortion . . . is a gruesome and inhumane procedure that 
is never medically necessary and should be prohibited.”22 
Immediately after the Act was signed into law, Planned 
Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. filed a suit challenging the 
constitutionality of the statute, and the City and County of San 
Francisco intervened as a plaintiff to protect the interests of its 
healthcare providers.23 The district court initially issued a temporary 
injunction against enforcement of the Act.24 After a three-week trial, 
at which thirteen expert witnesses testified, the district court entered a 
permanent injunction against enforcement of the Act, finding it to be 
unconstitutional on three separate grounds.25 First, despite the 
difference between the language of the two statutes, the district court 
found that the Act covered non-intact as well as intact D&E 
procedures, and thus “imposed an undue burden on a woman’s right 
to choose to terminate her pregnancy before viability.”26 In addition, 
the district court held that the Act was unconstitutionally vague 
because it “failed to put physicians on notice as to what procedures 
would violate the statute.”27 Finally, the district court found that 
Congress’s factual findings about the necessity of a health exception 
were “not entitled to controlling deference,” and therefore the lack of 
a health exception rendered the statute unconstitutional.28 
The Government then appealed the District Court’s decision, and 
the Ninth Circuit also held the Act unconstitutional on three distinct 
grounds.29 First, the appellate court held that “under even the most 
deferential level of review” it could not defer to Congress’s finding 
“that there is a consensus in the medical community that the 
prohibited procedures are never necessary to preserve the health of 
women choosing to terminate their pregnancies,”30 and thus the Act 
was unconstitutional due to its lack of a health exception.31 Second, 
the court found that “neither the differences . . . between the language 
 
 22. Id. at § 2(1). 
 23. Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc., 435 F.3d at 1169. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 1170. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 1171. 
 30. Id. at 1174. 
 31. Id. at 1176. 
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of the Act and the Nebraska statute nor the scienter requirements 
contained in the Act limit its application to the intact D&E 
procedure.”32 Thus, the court determined that the Act would produce 
a “chilling effect on doctors’ willingness to perform previability post-
first trimester abortions,” thereby imposing an unconstitutional 
“‘undue burden upon a woman’s right to make an abortion 
decision.’”33 Third, the appellate court held the Act was 
unconstitutionally vague because the statute did not “provide fair 
warning of the prohibited conduct to those it regulates and because 
the Act permits arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”34 
II.  SUPREME COURT’S DECISION 
On April 18th, in a somewhat surprising decision, the Supreme 
Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s ruling.35 Justice Kennedy wrote for 
the majority of the Court and dealt with each of the Ninth Circuit’s 
holdings in reverse order. First, the Court held that the Partial-Birth 
Abortion Ban Act of 2003 is not unconstitutionally vague.36 In making 
that determination, the Court emphasized four portions of the Act 
that explicitly define the type of abortion it prohibits, which keeps it 
from being unconstitutional37—(1) “the person performing the 
abortion must vaginally deliver a living fetus;” (2) the fetus be 
delivered beyond one of the “anatomical landmarks” defined by the 
Act; (3) the “doctor must perform an overt act, other than completion 
of delivery, that kills the partially delivered living fetus;” and (4) the 
Act has a scienter requirement38—and stated that based on those 
requirements, the Act. The majority then stated that those four 
requirements ensure that ordinary doctors can understand what type 
of conduct is prohibited by the Act and do not encourage arbitrary 
and discriminatory enforcement; thus, the Act did not meet the 
requirements of the “void-for-vagueness doctrine.”39 
 
 32. Id. at 1177. 
 33. Id. at 1180–81 (quoting Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 946 (2000)). 
 34. Id. at 1184. 
 35. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1639 (2007). 
 36. Id. at 1627. 
 37. Id. at 1627. 
 38. Id. at 1627–28 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 39. Id. at 1628–29. 
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Second, the Court held that the Act is not overbroad because it 
does not prohibit non-intact D&E.40 In making that determination, 
the Court once again focused on the Act’s intent requirements.41 In 
addition, the Court emphasized the differences in the Act and the 
Nebraska statute struck down in Stenberg. The Court highlighted the 
ways the Act differed from the Nebraska statute by again pointing to 
characteristics like the Act’s inclusion of the phrase “delivering a 
living fetus,” identification of the specific “anatomical landmarks,” and 
addition of the overt-act requirement.42 Additionally, the Court 
dispelled the respondent’s fears that any D&E may violate the Act—
because doctors do not always know whether their actions will result 
in a non-intact or intact D&E before they begin an abortion—by 
stating that the scienter requirements make the Act applicable 
exclusively to doctors who intend to perform an intact D&E from the 
outset of the procedure.43 
Next, the Court held that the lack of a health exception did not 
render the Act invalid on its face.44 The majority first acknowledged 
that “[t]here is documented medical disagreement whether the Act’s 
prohibition would ever impose significant health risks on women.”45 
However, the opinion then stated both that federal and state 
legislatures have wide discretion to pass legislation in areas of medical 
and scientific uncertainty and that “medical uncertainty does not 
foreclose the exercise of legislative power in the abortion context any 
more than it does in other contexts.”46 Therefore, the Court concluded 
that “the medical uncertainty over whether the Act’s prohibition 
creates significant health risks provides a sufficient basis to conclude 
in this facial attack that the Act does not impose an undue burden.”47 
This conclusion regarding the “undue burden” standard was 
supported by other factors as well, such as the fact that alternative 
forms of late-term abortion would still be available.48 
 
 40. Id. at 1629. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 1630–31. 
 43. Id. at 1631–32. 
 44. Id. at 1638. 
 45. Id. at 1636. 
 46. Id. at 1637. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
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Interestingly, the majority did not rely on the congressional 
findings that had been the subject of much debate in the lower courts 
in determining that the lack of a health exception did not invalidate 
the Act. While the Court acknowledged that it reviews congressional 
factfinding “under a deferential standard,” it stated that the Court 
“retains an independent constitutional duty to review factual findings 
where constitutional rights are at stake.”49 The majority then went as 
far as to point out that some of the congressional findings were 
“factually incorrect,” including Congress’ determination that there 
was a “medical consensus that the prohibited procedure is never 
medically unnecessary.”50 
Lastly, the majority, somewhat surprisingly, stated that “these 
facial attacks should not have been entertained in the first instance.”51 
Instead, the opinion stated that “the proper means to consider 
exceptions is by as-applied challenge.”52 The Court based this 
determination on the fact that an as-applied challenge would provide 
a more concrete factual scenario for analyzing an attack against the 
lack of a medical exception and the “heavy burden” that broad facial 
challenges impose upon the plaintiffs.53 
III.  THE DISSENT 
In a bitter dissent, Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Stevens, 
Souter, and Breyer, called the majority’s opinion “alarming”54 and 
strongly attacked the majority’s decision to uphold an abortion 
restriction that does not contain a health exception.55 In addition, the 
dissent questioned the majority’s determination that the Act advances 
the Government’s interest in promoting fetal life56 and its conclusion 
that a facial attack was not the proper means for challenging the 
statute.57 
 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 1638. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 1639. 
 54. Id. at 1641 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 55. Id. at 1640–46. 
 56. Id. at 1646–50. 
 57. Id. at 1650–52. 
2008__05 -- MASON__FMT.DOC 12/30/2008  4:35:16 PM 
44 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR VOL. 3:37 
 
In attacking the majority’s decision to uphold the Act absent a 
health exception, the dissent began by pointing out that for “the first 
time since Roe, the Court blesses a prohibition with no exception 
safeguarding a woman’s health.”58 Justice Ginsburg provided the 
dissent’s understanding of the Court’s holdings in Casey and Stenberg 
and stated that in Stenberg the Court made clear that where “banning 
a particular abortion procedure could endanger women’s health, a 
health exception is required.”59 The dissent then emphasized that in 
Casey, the Court reasoned that a division in medical opinion, as was 
present in this case, is a “factor that signals the presence of a medical 
risk, not its absence,” and thus, a complete ban on intact D&E 
abortions “consequently must contain a health exception.”60 
Additionally, the dissent reviewed the findings of Congress and 
the lower courts in regard to the safety benefits provided by intact 
D&E and highlighted the fact that the majority opinion even 
admitted that many of the congressional findings were incorrect, and 
that all three of the trial courts that heard challenges to the Act 
determined that “in some circumstances, intact D&E is the safest 
procedure.”61 Accordingly, the dissent called the majority’s 
conclusion—that the existence of medical uncertainty over whether 
the Act creates a significant health risk is a sufficient basis to uphold 
the ban—“bewildering,” stating that this position defied “the Court’s 
longstanding precedent affirming the necessity of a health exception, 
with no carve-out for circumstances of medical uncertainty.”62 
In questioning the majority’s assertion that the Act advances the 
Government’s interest in preserving and promoting fetal life, the 
dissent concluded that the Act, in fact, scarcely promotes fetal life and 
then asserted that the majority’s decision was truly based on “moral 
concerns.”63 In determining that the Act does little to preserve and 
promote fetal life, the dissent emphasized that the Act does not 
prevent any abortions, but rather prevents “only a method of 
performing abortion.”64 Additionally, the dissent stated that while the 
 
 58. Id. at 1641. 
 59. Id. at 1642 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 60. Id. at 1643. 
 61. Id. at 1645 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 62. Id. at 1646. 
 63. Id. at 1647. 
 64. Id. (emphasis in original). 
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Act does nothing to prevent abortions, it does have the effect of 
preventing a woman from choosing an intact D&E even when a 
doctor believes that is the safest procedure available to the woman.65 
In regards to the majority’s decision being based on “moral concerns,” 
the dissent stated that these concerns were not connected to “any 
ground genuinely serving the Government’s interest in preserving 
life.”66 The dissent then concluded that by basing its decision on moral 
concerns instead of fundamental rights, the majority “dishonors our 
precedent.”67 
Lastly, in vehemently denying the majority’s conclusion that a 
facial attack was not the proper means for challenging the Act, the 
dissent began by stating that “[t]his holding is perplexing given that, in 
materially identical circumstances we held that a statute lacking a 
health exception was unconstitutional on its face.”68 The dissent 
argued that based on Casey the majority’s conclusion that the 
“respondents have not shown that the ban on intact D&E would be 
unconstitutional in a large fraction of relevant cases” was based on an 
improper determination of relevant cases.69 The dissent stated that 
instead of basing the determination on all second trimester abortions, 
the determination should have been based on all women for whom 
intact D&E would be the safest procedure available.70 Therefore, the 
dissent concluded the Act would be unconstitutional in every relevant 
case because “the absence of a health exception burdens all women 
for whom [the Act] is relevant.”71 
IV.  IMPACT AND CONCLUSION 
Although it may take quite some time to determine the full effect 
of the Court’s departure from its long-standing abortion 
jurisprudence, Gonzales v. Carhart did provide an enormous amount 
of insight into the relatively new “Roberts Court.” Three main areas 
in which the decision supplied information about the Court were: the 
Court’s willingness, or lack thereof, to defer to Congressional findings 
 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 1650. 
 69. Id. at 1651 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. (emphasis in original). 
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of fact, the Court’s willingness to depart from precedent, and how the 
Court is going to deal with abortion, generally. 
The decision indicated that the current “Roberts Court” is going 
to be unwilling to place a disproportionate amount of weight on 
congressional findings of fact. Although the Court acknowledged that 
it reviews congressional findings of fact using a “deferential standard,” 
it also reaffirmed its own position of power among the branches of 
government by stating that the Court “retains an independent 
constitutional duty to review factual findings where constitutional 
rights are at stake.”72 Additionally, by pointing out a number of 
inaccuracies in the congressional findings,73 the Court indicated that it 
would not be willing to merely accept Congress’ findings, but rather 
that it would review those findings and use them only as a portion of 
the facts presented in the case. The Court indicated that Congress will 
need to provide findings that are substantially supported in order for 
them to have any effect on the Court’s ruling. Therefore, the Court 
sent a strong message that it will not allow Congress to “strong-arm” 
its decisions in controversial areas of the law where legislatures may 
benefit by taking definitive stances in order to please their 
constituents. 
The decision sent mixed messages about the “Roberts Court’s” 
willingness to depart from precedent. The Court’s decision to uphold 
the Act seems to be a large departure from some of its recent 
abortion decisions, but the majority maintained throughout its 
opinion that it was not departing from the precedents of those cases. 
First, the majority maintained from the beginning of its opinion that it 
was applying the holding of Casey.74 Secondly, the majority 
emphasized a number of differences between the Partial-Birth 
Abortion Ban Act and the Nebraska statute it struck down in 
Stenberg,75 making a seemingly overt effort to indicate its ability to 
uphold the Act without overruling its decision in Stenberg. 
The opinion indicates that the Court will not feel entirely 
obligated to follow its previous decisions, even when the issues 
presented in cases are quite similar. If the Court did not want to raise 
 
 72. Id. at 1637 (majority opinion). 
 73. Id. at 1638. 
 74. Id. at 1627. 
 75. Id. at 1629–31. 
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any questions concerning the viability of its previous abortion 
decisions, the majority could have easily struck down the Act by citing 
the similarities between the Act and the Nebraska statute challenged 
in Stenberg and Congress’ explicit desire to overturn Stenberg. 
However, it also seems difficult to go as far as the dissent did and say 
that the majority “refuses to take Casey and Stenberg seriously.”76 This 
case seems to leave the Court somewhere in the middle, possibly 
leaving the door open for a challenge to the reasoning in Casey. 
Additionally, this case could also introduce the possibility of 
challenges in other controversial areas of the law despite the 
existence of similar, even recently decided decisions. 
In regards to how the “Roberts Court” is going to deal with 
abortion generally, the decision seems to indicate what many people 
assumed when Justices Roberts and Alito were nominated by 
president Bush and confirmed by the Senate—that the “Roberts 
Court” is likely to have a more conservative view on the controversial 
issue of abortion. In addition, the decision shows that despite writing 
the majority opinion in Casey, Justice Kennedy, at least under the 
proper circumstances, is not unwilling to uphold bans on abortion, 
with or without exceptions for the health of the mother. 
In the most extreme case, this decision could open the door to 
challenging Roe v. Wade and women’s constitutional right to 
previability abortions. However, it seems somewhat unlikely that this 
will be the case because Justice Kennedy, the new swing vote on the 
Court, has previously supported women’s right to choose. A more 
narrow, and seemingly more realistic, interpretation of the decision 
would limit its applicability to intact D&E, and not allow the 
prohibition to be expanded to non-intact D&E, thus, still providing a 
woman the right to choose abortion, even in the second trimester. 
The most radical change to the Court’s abortion jurisprudence 
brought about by the decision is the way exceptions in abortion bans 
will now need to be challenged. Individuals wanting to challenge 
exceptions will now need to bring as-applied challenges against the 
exceptions instead of facial attacks. This change not only redefines 
how challenges will need to be made, but, as the dissent points out, 
may cause a gray area for women “whose circumstances have not 
 
 76. Id. at 1641 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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been anticipated by prior litigation.”77 Though this change seems to 
drastically alter the Court’s jurisprudence, it may also provide hope 
for individuals still wanting to challenge the Partial-Birth Abortion 
Ban Act because in concluding its opinion, the majority stated that 
“[t]his Act is open to a proper as-applied challenge in a discrete 
case.”78 
In conclusion, while it is yet to be determined whether this 
decision was, as Justice Ginsburg stated, “an effort to chip away” at a 
woman’s right to abortion,79 or rather the Court striking down one 
specific type of abortion that it felt to be overly heinous and 
unnecessary, one thing seems certain—litigation will soon begin in an 
attempt to determine the answer to exactly that question. 
 
 77. Id. at 1652. 
 78. Id. at 1639 (majority opinion). 
 79. Id. at 1653 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
